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Trial judges are considered the gatekeepers of expert testimony 
and have vast discretion in determining whether an expert’s 
methodology is reliable.1 The Seventh Circuit recently addressed the 
discretionary role that district courts play in assessing the reliability of 
an expert’s opinion in Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, where it upheld 
the exclusion of plaintiff’s expert in a design defect action due to the 
plaintiff’s failure to meet the standards of reliability set forth under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert.2 Bielskis illustrates not only 
the subjective nature of the district court’s assessment, but also the 
difficulty in successfully challenging a district court’s determination of 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2012, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., 2008, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
1 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993); 
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
2 Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, 663 F.3d 887, 897, 893-94 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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admissibility due to the deferential standard applied on appeal.3 
Further, Bielskis reminds us of the importance of ensuring that expert 
witnesses utilize a reliable methodology in formulating their opinions 
so as to avoid presenting the court with an opportunity to dismantle the 
entire case due solely to its subjective dissatisfaction with a party’s 
expert.4 
Part I of this note will discuss how to establish liability in design 
defect cases by exploring the history of the risk-utility and consumer-
expectation tests as well as the standards of proof for design defect 
cases required by each state comprising the Seventh Circuit. Part II of 
this note will then discuss federal procedural standards for the 
admissibility of expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 
and the Duabert Trilogy. Part III of this note will provide an overview 
of both the Seventh Circuit and the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois’ rulings in Bielskis. Part III will also argue 
that while the Seventh Circuit was correct in affirming the district 
court’s exclusion of plaintiff’s expert in this instance, district courts 
must adhere to the liberal underpinnings of Federal Rule of Evidence 
702 and its subsequent case law when performing the admissibility 
inquiry, rather than take advantage their discretionary power and 
deferential standard of review in order to dismiss those experts that do 
not meet their personal satisfaction.  
 
ESTABLISHING LIABILITY IN DESIGN DEFECT CASES 
 
A. History of the Risk-Utility Test v Consumer Expectation Test 
 
The first articulated standard of liability in design defect cases 
was set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, which 
provided that liability exists “only where the product is, at the time it 
leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the 
ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him.”5 
Although the text of Section 402A did not explicitly mandate the use 
                                                 
3 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-142 (1997). 
4 See id. 
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
2
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of the consumer expectation test as a means of proving a product was 
unreasonably dangerous, comment i to Section 402A implicitly 
established the test by stating, “[t]he article sold must be dangerous to 
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary 
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to 
the community as to its characteristics.”6  
The consumer expectation test was intended to provide an 
objective standard of proof based on the normal, ordinary and 
reasonable expectations of the average person7, but dissatisfaction 
with the consumer expectation test arose soon after its 
implementation.8 First, scholars found that the expectations of 
consumers provide an unwieldy, amorphous basis on which to assess 
manufacturer liability and that application of such a subjective and 
intuitive test could be easily manipulated to achieve a desired 
outcome.9 In addition, some attacked the test’s lack of guidance in 
cases where the product-caused harm affects third parties who have 
neither purchased nor consumed the product, and in situations where 
consumers have not formed specific expectations as to the product.10 
Lastly, concerns arose that the test has the practical effect of working 
against consumers under circumstances in which the manufacturer’s 
liability would further the interests of products liability law.11 This 
could occur if consumers’ expectations lag behind manufacturers’ 
advancing technologies or if consumers have pre-existing expectations 
that a product may be defective.12  
In response to these concerns, the Supreme Court of California in 
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. established the risk-utility test, which 
provides that a design defect may be proven by a demonstration that 
either: (1) the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary 
                                                 
6 Id. at cmt. i.  
7 See American Law of Products Liability 3d § 17:21. 
8 See Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1700, 1715 (2003). 
9 See id. 
10 See id. at 1716.  
11 See id. 
12 See id. 
3
Carroll: The Seventh Circuit Pulls the Ladder Out From Under Design Defect
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2012
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 7, Issue 2                         Spring 2012 
 
102 
consumer would expect under normal operating circumstances; or (2) 
the risks inherent in the product's design outweigh the benefits of that 
design.13 In 1997, the Restatement (Third) of Torts adopted its own 
version of this risk utility test requiring plaintiffs to show that “the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative 
design”.14 Most states now apply the Restatement’s risk utility test to 
design defect cases; however there are still a handful of states that 
apply a two prong test similar to the court in Barker, and few others 
still adhere only to the consumer expectation test.15 
 
B. Standard of Proof in Design Defect Cases as Applied by District 
Courts Comprising the Seventh Circuit 
 
This section discusses the standards of proof for design defect 
cases required by each state comprising the Seventh Circuit. Under the 
well-established Erie doctrine, a federal court sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction will apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits16, 
while simultaneously using federal law to resolve procedural and 
evidentiary issues.17 Therefore, a federal court sitting in diversity will 
apply the state law regarding the standards of proof and elements 
required to show a product was defectively designed.18  
 
1.  Indiana 
 
Indiana’s substantive law pertaining to liability for defective 
design is set forth in the Indiana Product Liability Act.19 To establish a 
prima facie case of liability under the Act, the plaintiff must show that: 
“(1) the product is defective and unreasonably dangerous; (2) the 
                                                 
13 Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455-56 (Cal. 1978). 
14 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2b (1998). 
15 See generally American Law of Products Liability 3d § 17:21. 
16 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (7th Cir.1994). 
17 Colip v. Clare, 26 F.3d 712, 714 (7th Cir. 1994). 
18 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.  
19 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-1-1 (West 2012). 
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defective condition existed at the time the product left the defendant's 
control; and (3) the defective condition was a proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries.”20 In determining whether a product design is 
“unreasonably dangerous”, Indiana is one of the few states that still 
applies only the consumer expectation test.21  
 
2.  Wisconsin 
 
Wisconsin is also part of the minority that applies solely the 
consumer expectation test when determining whether a product is 
defectively designed.22 Although Wisconsin has recognized the new 
insights into products liability provided by the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts23, it has thus far rejected the adoption the Restatement’s risk-
utility test.24 However, Justice Prosser’s concurrence, which was 
joined by Justice Ziegler and Justice Gablema, in Godoy ex rel. 
Gramling v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. suggests that the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court may be willing to adopt the risk-utility test 
should the opportunity present itself.25 In Godoy, the plaintiffs brought 
product liability and negligence claims against manufacturers of lead 
pigment under a risk-utility theory.26 The defendants moved to dismiss 
the design-defect claims arguing that white lead carbonate cannot be 
made without lead, and therefore, the plaintiff’s complaint essentially 
asserted that the defendants should have made a different product.27  
                                                 
20 Natural Gas Odorizing, Inc. v. Downs, 685 N.E.2d 155, 160 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1997). 
21 See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Gregg, 554 N.E.2d 1145, 1165-66 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that “[t]hough other jurisdictions have adopted a [risk-
utility] standard . . . Indiana has not moved toward the use of a utility/risk formula to 
assess unreasonableness in strict product liability cases”). 
22 See Godoy ex rel. Gramling v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 768 N.W.2d 
674, 696 (Wis. 2009) (Prosser, J., concurring). 
23 Haase v. Badger Mining Corp., 682 N.W.2d 389, 394 (Wis. 2004). 
24 Id. 
25 See Godoy, 768 N.W.2d at 692-700. 
26 Id. at 679. 
27 Id. at 679-80. 
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court majority agreed that a claim for 
defective design cannot be maintained when the alleged defect is an 
essential characteristic of the product itself.28 The majority opinion 
also reaffirmed that Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
continues to remain the touchstone of Wisconsin’s analysis for strict 
products liability.29 Although the court was not tasked with deciding 
upon the application of a risk utility test in this case, the tenor of 
Justice Prosser’s concurrence suggests that the court would if given 
the opportunity.30 The concurring opinion expressed concerns that 
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts no longer reflects 
the emerging complexities of products liability law.31 Justice Prosser 
also notes that Wisconsin is one of only six states that “clings to the 
consumer contemplation test” as the sole means of analyzing design-
defect claims.32 
 
3.  Illinois 
 
In 1965, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the Second 
Restatement of Tort’s doctrine of strict liability, which imposed strict 
liability on a seller of “any product in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property” 
through the consumer expectation test.33 Illinois courts, however, 
recognized the problems associated with the consumer expectation 
test34 and have accepted the rationale for the risk utility test as laid out 
                                                 
28 Id. at 687. The court’s holding seems to suggest that there can be no products 
liability when a design defect is a characteristic of the product itself. However, in 
instances where the product is inherently dangerous (i.e. it cannot be made safer, yet 
is useful in spite of its dangers), plaintiffs can bring failure to warn claims against 
defendant manufacturers. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k 
(1965). 
29 Godoy, 768 N.W.2d at 682.    
30 See Godoy, 768 N.W.2d at 692-700 
31 See id. at 694 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
32 Id. at 696 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
33 Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Ill. 1965). 
34 See Blue v. Envtl. Eng’g, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 1128, 1138 (Ill. 2005) (explaining 
that, “[i]t became apparent, however, that [the Restatement] created to address 
6
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by the California Supreme Court in Barker as an alternative means for 
proving liability.35 Such rationale includes the concepts that the 
consumer expectation test should be reserved only for use in cases in 
which the everyday experiences of a product’s consumers allow them 
to make a valid judgment on its safety and that not all consumers will 
be able to understand how safe an inherently complex and dangerous 
product could be made.36  
Thus, Illinois courts permit a plaintiff to use either the consumer 
expectation test or the risk-utility test to prove that the product is 
“unreasonably dangerous” in a strict liability design defect case.37 A 
plaintiff can employ the consumer expectation test by introducing 
evidence that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary 
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably 
foreseeable manner or the “risk utility test” by introducing evidence 
that the product's design proximately caused his injury and that the 
risk of danger inherent in the challenged design outweighs the benefits 
of such design.”38  
 
C.  Expert Testimony is Required to Establish Liability in Most Design 
Defect Cases. 
 
Expert testimony has historically been required to establish a 
design defect through the risk-utility test, when the design is not 
blatantly defective39 and when an understanding of the technical, 
scientific nature of the defect is beyond the general experience or 
common understanding of laypersons.40 Correspondingly, courts have 
                                                                                                                   
manufacturing defects, did not adequately cover design defects or defects based on 
inadequate warnings”). 
35 Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 864 N.E.2d 249, 255 (Ill. 2007). 
36 See id. at 255-256.  
37 Lamkin v. Towner, 563 N.E.2d 449, 457 (Ill. 1990). 
38 Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 764 N.E.2d 35, 43 (Ill. 2002) (citing 
Lamkin, 563 N.E.2d at 457).  
39 Meaning, where the existence of a defect is not beyond the common 
understanding of a lay juror. See, e.g., Owens v. Ford Motor Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 
1099, 1103-04 (S.D. Ind. 2003). 
40 Id. at 1103. 
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generally held that expert testimony is not always required to establish 
a design defect through the consumer expectations test when the lay 
person's understanding would constitute a basis for a legal inference 
and not mere speculation.41 However, the Seventh Circuit’s recent 
decision in Show v. Ford demonstrated the need for expert testimony 
to establish liability in most design defect claims regardless of whether 
they are brought under the risk utility test or the consumer 
expectations test.42  
In Show, a 1993 Ford Explorer was struck by another car near the 
left rear wheel while passing through an intersection.43 The Explorer 
rolled over, injuring the driver of the car and a passenger.44 The 
plaintiffs filed suit against Ford alleging that the Explorer’s defective 
design rendered it unstable.45 The plaintiffs did not retain an expert to 
testify as to the vehicle’s defective design and argued that expert 
testimony was unnecessary under the consumer-expectation test 
because “jurors, as consumers, can find in their own experience all of 
the evidence required for liability.”46 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s holding that the plaintiffs could not establish a prima 
facie case of a design defect in the Explorer without expert testimony, 
even under the consumer expectations test.47 The court reasoned that 
the consumer-expectation test is not an independent theory of 
recovery, but rather a factor subsumed within the broader risk-utility 
                                                 
41 Id.; See also Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Ill. 2d 516, 554, (2008) 
(explaining, “[t]he consumer-expectation test is a single-factor test and, therefore, 
narrow in scope . . . The jury is asked to make a single determination: whether the 
product is unsafe when put to a use that is reasonably foreseeable considering its 
nature and function. No evidence of ordinary consumer expectations is required, 
because the members of the jury may rely on their own experiences to determine 
what an ordinary consumer would expect” (citing Besse v. Deere & Co., Ill. 3d 497, 
500 (1992) and Mele v. Howmedica, Inc., Ill. 3d 1, 14 (2004))).  
42 See Show v. Ford Motor Co., 659 F.3d 584, 587.  (7th Cir. 2011). 
43 Id. at 584. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 585.  
47 Id. at 587-588 (noting that it “takes expert evidence to establish a complex 
product’s unreasonable dangerousness through a consumer-expectations approach”).  
8
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test.48 Just as the risk-utility test indisputably requires expert 
testimony, the consumer expectations test does as well.49   
The court also emphasized that expert testimony is required to 
establish the unreasonable dangerousness of a complex product, such 
as a car, through a consumer-expectations approach.50 Without the 
assistance of expert testimony in a complex products-liability case, a 
jury would have to speculate about matters outside its understanding.51 
However, given the court’s reference to the vehicle as a “complex 
product”52, it is unclear whether the Seventh Circuit’s holding 
requiring expert testimony extends to simple product defects that can 
be easily understood through the jurors’ own experiences and 
understanding.  
It should be noted that the Seventh Circuit focused much of its 
opinion in Show on whether the need for expert testimony is one of 
substantive or procedural law.53 Ultimately, because both parties 
assumed that state law determines whether expert testimony is 
required, the court decided it under Illinois law and did not have to 
rule on the issue.54 However, the court’s dicta indicates that there may 
be a question as to whether Illinois treats the risk-utility and 
consumer-expectation tests as substantive or procedural in nature.55 
The court highlights the Illinois Supreme Court’s statement in 
Mikolajczyk that “[the consumer-expectation test and the risk-utility 
test] . . . are not theories of liability; they are methods of proof by 
which a plaintiff ‘may demonstrate’ that the element of unreasonable 
dangerousness is met.”56 Thus, the court suggests that the two tests are 
                                                 
48 Id. at 587.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 588. 
52 Id. at 585. 
53 See id. at 585-87. 
54 Id. at 585 (explaining, “[t]he assumption rests on a belief that the quality of 
proof is part of the claim's substantive elements, which depend on state law under 
the Erie doctrine even when substantive doctrine is implemented through evidentiary 
rules”). 
55 Id.  
 56 Id. at 585-86 (citing Mikolajczyk, 231 Ill.2d at 548).  
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simply procedural in nature and thus federal law would apply when 
determining whether expert testimony is required to sustain a products 
liability claim.57 
 
FEDERAL ADMISSABILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
 
A. Frye v. United States 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit’s 1923 decision in Frye v. United States marked the first 
judicial establishment of an evidentiary standard for the admissibility 
of scientific expert evidence.58 In Frye, the defendant offered an expert 
witness to testify as to the results of a systolic blood pressure 
deception test, a precursor to the polygraph lie detector, as evidence of 
his innocence of a murder conviction.59 The court established the 
general acceptance test, which provides that novel scientific expert 
evidence is only admissible when the scientific principle or technique 
from which it is deduced has gained general acceptance in its field.60 
Because the systolic blood pressure deception test had not yet gained 
scientific standing among physiological and psychological authorities, 
the court excluded the defendant’s expert from testifying as to the 
test’s results.61  
Since Frye’s general acceptance test was the sole requisite for 
expert admissibility, theories or techniques not generally accepted in 
the scientific community were inadmissible without exception.62 By 
“abdicating . . . to scientists the responsibility for ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence”, Frye diminished judicial discretion and 
                                                 
57 Id. at 586. 
58 Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 
595, 629 (1988) (citing E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 203 at 608 (3d ed. 
1984)). 
59 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
60 Id. at 1014. 
61 Id. 
62 See Judith A. Hasko, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: 
Flexible Judicial Screening of Scientific Expert Evidence Under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 479, 481 (1995).  
10
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 2
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol7/iss2/2
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 7, Issue 2                         Spring 2012 
 
109 
removed a judge’s ability to independently review the merits of the 
specific scientific evidence in a case.63 The judiciary responded to 
Frye’s restraints on judicial discretion by manipulating their 
definitions of the scientific community or general acceptance in order 
to influence the determination of admissible evidence.64 In this light, 
Frye failed to provide a workable cohesive standard of admissibility 
and effectively denied litigants the opportunity to present valid 
scientific evidence to support their claims.65  
In 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
including Rule 702 which provided that “if the expert’s scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.66 
With no mention of Frye or the general acceptance test in either the 
language of Rule 702 or its legislative drafting history67, a debate 
arose regarding whether the common law general acceptance standard 
continued to be a viable means of determining the admissibility of 
expert testimony.68 Many scholars interpreted the rule’s silence to 
                                                 
 63 Id. at 482 (citing Paul C. Giannelli, Frye v. United States, Background 
Paper Prepared for the National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists, 99 F.R.D. 
189, 191-93 (1983) and Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of 
Evidence After Sixteen Years--the Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the 
Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for 
Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 878 (1992) (quoting 
United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970)). 
64 See id. at 482-483; see also David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of 
Scientific Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2139, 2140 (1994) (explaining, “[s]ome judges interpreted [the 
general acceptance] rule as allowing almost any credentialed scientist's testimony, 
however implausible, to be presented to a jury. This became known as the ‘let-it-all-
in’ approach”).  
 65 See Hasko, supra note 57 at 482-83. 
66 FED. R. EVID. 702.  
67 FED. R. EVID. 702; PUB. L. NO. 93-595 (1975). 
 68 See, e.g., Becker & Orenstein, supra note 58 at 879; Hasko, supra note 
57 at 484;  Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the 
Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REV. 745, 747 (1990).  
11
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suggest that the Frye test still applied as “[i]t would be odd if the 
Advisory Committee and the Congress intended to overrule the vast 
majority of cases excluding such evidence . . . without explicitly 
stating so.”69 However, plain meaning jurisprudence restricted the 
continued application of Frye due to the absence of its mention in the 
rule or committee notes.70 Thus, a split persisted amongst the federal 
courts as to the standard of expert admissibility.71 
 
B. The Daubert Trilogy 
 
1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
 
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., the United States 
Supreme Court rejected Frye’s rigid general acceptance standard for 
admissibility and established a liberal approach, which placed 
complete discretion to screen scientific expert evidence in the hands of 
the judiciary.72 In Daubert, plaintiffs sued the defendant 
pharmaceutical company to recover for limb reduction birth defects 
allegedly caused by the mothers’ prenatal ingestion of defendant’s 
anti-nausea drug Bendectin.73 The plaintiffs offered the testimony of 
eight experts, who relied upon “in vitro” (test tube) and “in vivo” 
(live) animal studies, pharmacological studies, and reanalysis of 
previously published studies in concluding that Bendectin could cause 
birth defects.74 However, the district court granted defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment, which contended that the plaintiffs would be 
                                                 
69 U.S. v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Saltzburg & 
Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 702 (3d ed. 1982)). 
70 60 Am. Jur. Trials 1 (Originally published in 1996). 
71 Compare, Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987) and 
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) (both finding the Rules do 
not incorporate Frye), with United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir.1987) and United States v. 
Distler, 671 F.2d 954 (6th Cir.) (all holding Rules do incorporate Frye).  
72 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 
(1993). 
73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 583.  
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unable to come forward with admissible evidence showing Bendectin 
caused birth defects.75 In relying on Frye’s general acceptance test, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit subsequently 
affirmed the District Court’s decision on the grounds that plaintiffs’ 
expert evidence was based on methodology that was not generally 
accepted as a reliable technique in the scientific community.76 The 
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the judgment, holding that the 
Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence77 and that such “a rigid ‘general acceptance’ requirement 
would be at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules and their 
‘general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion 
testimony.’”78   
The Supreme Court noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence 
require the trial judge to act as a gatekeeper in determining whether an 
expert is proposing to testify as to scientific knowledge that will assist 
the trier of fact to understand or determine the fact at issue.79 Such a 
determination entails a preliminary assessment of whether the 
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid (i.e. 
reliable) and of whether the methodology can be applied to the facts in 
issue (i.e. relevant).80 The Daubert Court set forth the following non-
exhaustive guideposts to assist the district courts in determining 
whether proffered scientific expert testimony can be characterized as a 
reliable: (1) whether the theory has been or is capable of being tested; 
(2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and 
publication; (3) the theory's known or potential rate of error; and (4) 
the theory's level of acceptance within the relevant community.81    
 
                                                 
 75 Id. at 582.  
 76 Id. at 584.  
77 Id. at 587. 
78 Id. at 588 (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988). 
79 Id. at 592. 
80 Id. at 592-93 
81 Id. at 593–94. 
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2.  General Electric Co., et. al. v. Joiner 
 
In General Electric Co., et. al. v. Joiner, the United States 
Supreme Court expanded on Daubert by establishing abuse of 
discretion as the proper standard to review a district court’s ruling as to 
whether to admit or exclude expert scientific evidence.82 In Joiner, the 
plaintiff, after being diagnosed with small-cell lung cancer, brought a 
claim alleging that his disease was promoted by workplace exposure to 
chemical polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's) present in materials 
manufactured by the defendants.83 The district court granted General 
Electric’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning that plaintiff’s 
experts’ opinion that exposure to PCBs caused small-cell lung cancer 
did not rise above “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”84 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that the district court erred in 
excluding the plaintiff’s expert.85 The court explained, “[b]ecause the 
Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony display a 
preference for admissibility, we apply a particularly stringent standard 
of review to the trial judge's exclusion of expert testimony.”86 The 
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and reversed the 
Appellate Court’s decision.87  
The Supreme Court majority held that the Court of Appeals erred 
in its holding of the exclusion of plaintiff’s experts' testimony by 
applying an overly “stringent” review and failing to give the district 
court the “deference that is the hallmark of abuse-of-discretion 
review.”88 Abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review of a 
district court's evidentiary rulings and an appellate court will reverse a 
district court’s ruling only if it is manifestly erroneous.89 In applying 
an abuse of discretion review, a court of appeals may not categorically 
                                                 
82 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997). 
83 Id. at 139. 
84 Id. at 140. 
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 141. 
88 Id. at 143. 
89 See id. at 141-142.  
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distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and those that 
do not.90 Further, a court of appeals may not subject a district court’s 
ruling to a more searching standard of review simply because its 
holding is outcome determinative, such as in the case of a ruling in 
favor of a motion for summary judgment.91 The Seventh Circuit has 
explicitly affirmed its intention of applying this deferential standard of 
review.92 For example, in Bradley v. Brown, the Seventh Circuit 
explained, “[the] decision to allow expert testimony is within the 
broad discretion of the trial judge and is to be sustained on appeal 
unless manifestly erroneous.”93 
 
3.  Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael 
 
In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, the plaintiffs brought a 
product liability action against the defendant tire manufacturer for 
injuries sustained when the right rear tire on a vehicle failed.94 The 
plaintiffs’ case relied heavily upon the opinion of their expert tire 
failure analyst that the blowout was caused by a defect in the tire’s 
design.95 His opinion was based upon a visual inspection of the tire 
and an application of his knowledge pertaining to tire blowouts to the 
facts at issue.96 The district court granted defendant’s motion to 
exclude the plaintiffs’ expert on the basis that his methodology was 
unreliable; however, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s 
holding on the belief that Daubert was only applicable to the scientific 
testimony and not to skill or experience based testimony.97 The 
Supreme Court disagreed and held that a federal trial judge's gate 
keeping obligation applies not only to scientific testimony, but to all 
                                                 
90 See id. at 136.  
91 See id. at 142-143. Practically, a trial court can avoid reversal of motion for 
summary judgment ruling on appeal by first striking the expert testimony necessary 
to establish the plaintiff’s case.  
92 See Bradley v. Brown, 42 F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 1994). 
93 Id. 
94 Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999). 
95 Id. 
96 See id. at 144.  
97 Id. at 145-146. 
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expert testimony.98 The Court also held that the Rule 702 inquiry is “a 
flexible one”99 and a district court has broad discretion in determining 
which of the Daubert factors are pertinent in assessing reliability.100 
District courts may fulfill their gate keeping duty by performing any 
inquiry it chooses “so long as the content and purpose of Daubert is 
not forgotten.”101 Thus, a court of appeals must give deference to both 
the trial court’s decision whether to admit expert testimony as well as 
the criteria used to make that decision.102 
 
C.  JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN ASSESSING ADMISSABILITY OF 
EXPERT TESTIOMNY 
 
In 2000, Congress responded to Daubert and its progeny by 
amending Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to read as follows:  
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, 
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods 
reliably to the facts of the case.103  
                                                 
98 Id. at 149. 
99 Id. at 150 (explaining, “The [Daubert] factors may or may not be pertinent in 
assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular 
expertise, and the subject of his testimony.” Id. at 138). 
100 See id. at 152.  
101 Jonathan R. Schofield, A Misapplication of Daubert: Compton v. Subaru of 
America Opens the Gate for Unreliable and Irrelevant Expert Testimony, 1997 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 489, 513 (1997). 
102 See Kumho Tire at 158 (holding, “Rule 702 grants the district judge the 
discretionary authority, reviewable for its abuse, to determine reliability in light of 
the particular facts and circumstances of the particular case”). 
103 5 Handbook of Fed. Evid. § 702:5 (7th ed.) (citing FED. R. EVID. 702 
(effective December 1, 2000)). FED. R. EVID. 702 was restyled effective December 
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The Advisory Committee expressly noted that it did not amend 
Rule 702 in a specific attempt to codify the Daubert factors.104 In fact, 
the committee note explains that any procedural requirements for the 
exercise of the trial court’s gate keeping function are purposely absent 
from the amended rule in order to allow trial courts both flexibility and 
discretion in considering expert admissibility.105 The committee note 
goes on to state, “[a] review of the caselaw after Daubert shows that 
the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the 
rule.”106 Opinions are excluded when they are unhelpful and therefore 
superfluous and a waste of time.107  
The amendment does not provide an automatic challenge to all 
expert testimony;108 rather, “[v]igorous cross-examination, 
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the 
burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking 
shaky but admissible evidence.”109 District courts do not have 
discretionary authority to “accept or reject” expert testimony, as this is 
part of the jury’s fact finding role.110 The district court need not 
determine whether the proposed expert testimony is irrefutable or 
correct since an expert’s opinion is admissible so long as he can 
account for “how and why” the it was reached.111 Therefore, an 
                                                                                                                   
1, 2011, but all changes were intended to be stylistic in nature and did not effect the 
functionality of the rule. See id. and FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
104 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
105 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note; see also Craig Lee 
Montz, Trial Judges As Scientific Gatekeepers After Daubert, Joiner, Kumho Tire, 
and Amended Rule 702: Is Anyone Still Seriously Buying This?, 33 UWLA L. REV. 
87, 100-02 (2001). 
106 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
107 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (citing 7 Wigmore § 1918). 
108 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (citing Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 
at 158). 
109 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. 
110 See Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note (stating, “the amendment 
is not intended to limit the right to jury trial, nor to permit a challenge to the 
testimony of every expert, nor to preclude the testimony of experience-based experts, 
nor to prohibit testimony based on competing methodologies within a field of 
expertise”).  
111 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 144. 
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expert’s opinion is not considered unreliable simply because all other 
potential causes cannot be excluded, so long as the expert offered an 
explanation as to why a proffered alternative was not the sole cause.112 
The suggestion of an alternative cause affects the weight that the jury 
should give the expert's testimony rather than the admissibility of that 
testimony.113  
Various circuits have articulated the need to restrict the district 
court’s gate keeping function. The Second Circuit has explained that 
district courts must be restrained in their gate keeping function, as 
limitless discretion would “inexorably lead to evaluating witnesses 
credibility and weight of the evidence, the ageless role of the jury.”114 
The Second Circuit further elaborated that “[d]isputes as to the 
strength of [an expert's] credentials, faults in his use of [a particular] 
methodology, or lack of textual authority for his opinion, go to the 
weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony.”115 The Third Circuit 
has also stressed that the court is only a gatekeeper, as “[a] party 
confronted with an adverse expert witness who has sufficient, though 
perhaps not overwhelming, facts and assumptions as the basis for his 
opinion can highlight those weaknesses through effective cross-
examination.”116 Finally, the Fifth Circuit has emphasized that “the 
trial court's role as gatekeeper is not tended to serve as a replacement 
for the adversary system”.117  
 
                                                 
112 See Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 265-266 (4th Cir. 
1999). 
113 See id. at 265. 
114 McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Company, 61 F.3d 1038, 1045 (2nd Cir. 1995). 
115 Id. at 1044. 
116 Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 414 (3d Cir.2002).  
117 United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land Situated in Leflore Cnty., Miss., 80 
F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996) 
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BIELSKIS V. LOUISVILLE LADDER 
 
A.  The Facts 
 
Raymond Bielskis, an acoustical ceiling carpenter, occasionally 
required a scaffold in order to perform his job duties.118 In 1997, 
Bielskis employer, R.G. Construction, provided him with an assembled 
Louisville Ladder SM 1404 mini-scaffold ladder.119 The mini-scaffold 
was a four-foot long mobile unit with hinged sides allowing for 
collapsible storage, rungs for planks the user stands on, and four 
wheels that can be locked in place while in use.120 Each wheel was 
screwed to a leg of the scaffold with a caster and threaded metal 
stem.121  
In 2001, Bielskis began working for a new employer, 
International Decorators, who provided him with new scaffolding.122 
Thus, between 2001 and 2005, he had used his Louisville Ladder mini 
scaffold on only one or two occasions to haul tools to and from his 
car.123 On March 17, 2005, Bielskis used the Louisville Ladder mini-
scaffold while working on ceiling tiles at a Motorola jobsite in 
Libertyville, Illinois because he lent the scaffolding supplied by 
International Decorators to his coworker.124 After working on the mini-
scaffold for several hours, Bielskis wheeled it into another room, 
stepped up onto the scaffold and began to work when the caster stem 
above one of the scaffold’s wheels broke, causing him to collapse to 
the floor and suffer injuries to his hand and knee.125 Bielskis brought a 
products liability design defect claim against the defendant ladder 
manufacturer, Louisville Ladder, under Illinois’ risk-utility test.126 
                                                 
118 Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d 887, 889 (7th Cir. 2011). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 890. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 889. 
123 Id.  
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 889-890. 
126 Id. at 891. Bielskis also filed negligence, manufacturing defect, failure to 
warn, and res ipsa loquitur claims against Louisville Ladder.  
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B.  Plaintiff’s Expert 
 
Bielskis retained mechanical engineer Neil J. Mizen to provide 
expert testimony as to what caused the scaffold’s caster stem to 
break.127 Mizen had extensive engineering experience: he obtained 
both a bachelor's and master's degree in Mechanical Engineering; 
developed packaging machinery and manufacturing processes at 
Cornell laboratory; founded Mizen Engineering Company, Inc., where 
he designed and built equipment and computer-based control systems 
used in manufacturing processes; and testified as an expert in a various 
cases pertaining to manufacturing and design flaws.128  
Mizen provided a written report in which he opined that tensile 
stress129 generated from over-tightening the caster during installation 
into the leg caused a brittle fracture in the threaded stud secured to the 
top flange of the caster.130 He observed that the fractured surface 
revealed a clean break consistent with a brittle fracture, rather than a 
dull and fibrous appearance or plastic deformation common in ductile 
fractures.131 He further concluded that the brittle fracture could have 
been avoided by either attaching the wheel with a different mechanism 
than the threaded stud, or by simply not over-tightening the stud.132 
Mizen relied on his basic engineering background and experience, 
research pertaining to brittle fractures obtained from the internet, and 
an hour-long visual examination in forming his opinion that the caster 
stem failed due to a brittle fracture induced by over tightening.133 He 
also observed the fracture at the end of the caster through a 
                                                 
127 Id. 
128 Id.  
129 The court explained tensile stress as the stress that leads to expansion 
(usually in length) while the volume stays constant; it is the opposite of compressive 
stress, which occurs when the material is under compression and the volume 
decreases. Id. at 892. Mizen defined tensile strength as “the ability of an object to 
resist tensile forces.” Id.  
130 Id. at 891-892. 
131 Id. at 892. A ductile fracture is one “where the material pulls apart instead of 
snapping or cracking suddenly.” Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 894-895. 
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microscope during the parties’ joint inspection and reviewed the 
calculations generated by the defendant’s expert.134 Mizen did not, 
however, test his theory in an attempt to quantify the tensile strength 
of the caster stem or test his proposed alternate design.135 
 
C.  Defendant’s Expert 
 
Louisville Ladder also retained an expert, Engineering Systems, 
Inc. (“ESI”) who, concluded that the caster stem sustained a brittle 
fracture caused by the loosening of the caster stem.136 ESI used digital 
calipers to measure the height between the HEX mating surface, the 
caster insert mating surface, and the corresponding fracture 
surfaces.137 ESI also created positive and negative replicas of the 
caster stem in order to examine the fractured surfaces in detail.138 
Finally, ESI performed stress analysis calculations in order to assess 
the stresses present at the stud site with different degrees of 
tightness.139 
 
D.  The District Court Rejects Plaintiff’s Expert’s Methodology 
 
The defendant moved to bar Mizen’s testimony under Daubert, 
arguing that his failure to test or examine the proposed design 
alternatives rendered his scientific methodology unreliable.140 
Although the district court found that Mizen’s education and 
experience rendered him qualified to testify as an expert, it granted 
defendant’s motion.141 The district court held that absent testing or 
data reflecting an acceptance of his theory within the scientific 
community, Mizen’s conclusion that the brittle fracture was caused by 
                                                 
134 Brief of Appellant at 14-16, Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d 
887 (2011) (No. 10-1194), 2010 WL 3950497. 
135 Bielskis, 663 F.3d at 894-895. 
136 Id. at 892. 
137 Id. at 895. 
138 Id.  
139 Id.  
140 Id. at 892. 
141 Id. at 894. 
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over tightening constituted nothing more than an illogical leap or an 
off-the-cuff conclusion.142 The district court explained, “Bielskis's 
failure to establish admissibility under any single Daubert factor is not 
dispositive, but [his] failure to establish admissibility under any of the 
factors leaves the Court no choice but to bar Mizen's testimony.”143 
The district court then denied Bielskis’ motion to reopen discovery in 
order to obtain a new liability expert and granted defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment, as Bielskis could not establish his products 
liability claim without expert evidence.144  
 
E.  The Seventh Circuit Affirms 
 
Bielskis appealed to the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the district 
court abused its discretion by excluding Mizen’s testimony.145 Like the 
district court, the Seventh Circuit took issue with the reliability of 
Mizen’s methodology and held that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by barring Mizen’s testimony as his methodology lacked 
“recognized hallmarks of scientific reliability.”146 The court 
determined that Mizen used no particular methodology at all in 
reaching his conclusions as he failed to: (1) test the caster stem for 
measurements, alloy composition and tensile strength; (2) test his 
proposed design alternatives; (3) submit information demonstrating a 
consensus within the engineering community in support of his 
conclusion; or (4) subject his opinion to peer review as it was based on 
a visual examination.147 The Seventh Circuit noted the discretion 
afforded to district courts in assessing the reliability of expert 
testimony: “we give the district court wide latitude in performing its 
gate-keeping function in determining both how to measure the 
reliability of expert testimony and whether the testimony itself is 
                                                 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 896. 
144 Id. at 892. 
145 Id. at 893. 
146 Id. at 897. 
147 Id. at 895. 
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reliable”.148 Thus, the Seventh Circuit deferred to the lower court’s 
belief that Mizen's methodology amounted to nothing more than 
“‘talking off the cuff’—without data or analysis.”149 
The Seventh Circuit also affirmed the district’s court’s denial of 
Bielskis’ motion for a continuance to obtain another expert.150 The 
court observed that given the case-management nature of such a 
request, district courts have broad discretion when ruling whether or 
not a plaintiff should be allowed to retain another expert.151 The court 
reasoned that granting Bielskis’ motion would give him a “second bite 
at the expert witness apple”, which would run afoul to notions of 
efficient case management.152 
Lastly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of 
summary judgment in favor of Louisville Ladder.153 The court gave 
credence to Bielskis’ argument that under Illinois law, product liability 
cases where the cause of action rests upon the assertion that the 
product failed “to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected”, 
(i.e. failed per the consumer expectation test) do not require expert 
testimony in order to establish a prima facie case.154  However, the 
court denied Bielskis’ attempt to apply the consumer expectation test 
because he failed to establish a prima facie element to a manufacturing 
defect claim – that the mini-scaffold was defective at the time it left 
Louisville Ladder’s control.155  
 
                                                 
148 Id. at 894 (citing Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 616 (7th Cir.2010)). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 897. 
151 Id.  
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 899. 
154 Id. at 898. As discussed in Part I of this note, the rule of law has since 
changed and now Illinois requires expert testimony to prove liability in complex 
products liability cases brought under both the consumer expectation test and 
products liability cases brought under the risk utility test. See Show v. Ford Motor 
Co., 659 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2011).  
155 Bielskis, 663 F.3d at 898. 
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F.  Analysis 
 
The Daubert standard was designed to ensure that expert 
witnesses adhere to the same standards of intellectual rigor that are 
demanded in their professional work when testifying in court.156 As 
gatekeepers, district courts are tasked with the duty of ensuring that an 
expert does not extrapolate from an accepted premise to an unfounded 
conclusion.157 In order to ensure district courts are effective gate 
keepers, they are afforded a great deal of discretion in deciding both 
whether to admit expert testimony as well as which criteria is used to 
make that decision.158  
This judicial discretion should be exercised in conjunction with 
the spirit of Rule 702, which was originally enacted to offset Frye’s 
general acceptance test and its effect of diminishing judicial discretion 
by placing the admissibility determination into the hands of the 
scientific community.159 The intent of the Rule was to relax the 
traditional barriers to the admission of opinion testimony by placing 
complete discretion back into the hands of the judiciary.160 District 
courts should be mindful of this liberal intent when applying the 
Daubert factors to a reliability assessment, as rejection of expert 
testimony is the exception rather than the rule.161  
This judicial discretion should also be exercised within the limits 
established by case law following the enactment of Rule 702. District 
courts do not have discretionary authority to “accept or reject” expert 
testimony, as this is part of the jury’s fact finding role.162 Further, 
                                                 
156 See Chapman v. Maytag Corp., 297 F.3d 682, 688 (7th Cir. 2002). 
157 See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146 (explaining that a district court “may conclude 
that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion 
proffered”). 
158 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 158. 
159 See Hasko, supra note 57 at 481-482.  
160 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.  
161 SEE FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
162 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (stating, “the amendment 
is not intended to limit the right to jury trial, nor to permit a challenge to the 
testimony of every expert, nor to preclude the testimony of experience-based experts, 
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district courts do not have discretion to exclude shaky but admissible 
evidence as it is more appropriately attacked through cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction 
on the burden of proof.163 Lastly, it is not within a district court’s 
discretion to exclude expert testimony simply because all other 
potential causes cannot be disqualified, as the suggestion of an 
alternative cause affects the weight that the jury should give the 
expert's testimony rather than its admissibility.164 
Bielskis illustrates how the perception of whether an admissibility 
determination is made in accordance with the spirit of Rule 702 and is 
within the common law limitations rests solely upon the reviewing 
judge’s own subjective belief.165 In Bielskis, the district court held that 
the plaintiff failed to establish its expert’s admissibility under any of 
the Daubert factors.166 The court particularly focused on the fact that 
plaintiff’s expert did not personally test his theories, while the 
defendant’s expert did perform physical testing.167 However, the 
Seventh Circuit noted in Cummins v. Lyle Industries that hands-on 
testing or observations made by the expert himself is not an absolute 
prerequisite to the admission of expert testimony, as an expert’s 
methodology may satisfy the reliability requirement for admissibility 
through the review of experimental, statistical, or scientific data 
generated by others in the field.168 Mizen did just that - he reviewed 
the calculations generated by the defendant’s expert in order to form 
his conclusions.169 While it is possible for Mizen’s review to be 
considered as reliable scientific method per Cummins, it certainly was 
not considered to be so under the Seventh Circuit’s review in Bielskis. 
                                                                                                                   
nor to prohibit testimony based on competing methodologies within a field of 
expertise”).  
163 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. 
164 See Westberry, 178 F.3d at 265-266. 
165 Bielskis, 663 F.3d at 894. 
166 Bielskis, 663 F.3d at 896. 
167 Id. at 894. 
168 See Cummins v. Lyle Industries, 93 F.3d 362, 396 (7th Cir. 1996). 
169 Brief of Appellant at 14-16, Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d 
887 (2011) (No. 10-1194), 2010 WL 3950497. 
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Personal observation alone is not a substitute for scientific 
methodology and is insufficient to satisfy Daubert.170 However, an 
opinion based upon observation as well as scientific knowledge and 
experience may constitute sufficient scientific methodology.171 Experts 
tie observations to conclusions through the use of what Judge Learned 
Hand called “general truths derived from ... specialized experience.”172 
In Bielskis, Mizen explicitly explained that he based his opinion partly 
upon his engineering knowledge and experience.173 Although courts 
may consider an application of specialized knowledge and experience 
as reliable scientific methodology in other instances, this was, again, 
not the case in Bielskis. 
The district court was not necessarily wrong in its exclusion of 
Mizen - even if his opinions were based upon sound scientific 
methodology, he appeared to have a difficult time articulating what 
that methodology was.174 Nonetheless, the district court’s holding 
serves as an illustration of the vast amount of discretion judges possess 
when determining admissibility on a case-by-case basis. Such a 
subjective determination is likely to lead to an inconsistent application 
of the Daubert factors among the district courts, which will in turn 
have a negative effect on litigants. For example, after granting the 
defendant’s motion to exclude Mizen, the district court then granted 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment since Bielskis could not 
establish his products liability claim without expert evidence.175 Not 
only did the judge’s subjective dislike of Mizen’s methodology 
dismantle the plaintiff’s entire case, but it also likely cost the plaintiff 
a significant amount of money spent in preparation for litigation. 
                                                 
170 Chapman v. Maytag Corp., 297 F.3d 682, 688 (7th Cir. 2002). 
171 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 148. 
172 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 148-49 (quoting Learned Hand, Historical and 
Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L.REV. 40, 54 
(1901)). 
173 Bielskis, 663 F.3d at 894-895. 
174 Id. at 894 (explaining that “[w]hen questioned as to what scientific 
methodology he used to reach this conclusion, Mizen replied that he had relied on 
“basic engineering intelligence” and “solid engineering principles that any other 
engineer would use”).  
175 Id. at 899. 
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Given the broad discretion of the trial judge as well as the deferential 
standard of review on appeal, it is seemingly difficult to succeed in 
challenging a district court’s reliability assessment.176 Thus, the 





Although the Seventh Circuit’s affirmation was correct in light of 
the deferential standard of review on appeal, Bielskis illustrates the 
importance of ensuring that an expert’s testimony is based on rigorous 
testing, rather than simply a visual observation, personal knowledge, 
or an examination of available opinions and data, in order to survive 
both judicial scrutiny in determining reliability as well as a motion for 
summary judgment should the district court find the expert unreliable. 
The discretion afforded by the admissibility inquiry under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence and Daubert, as well as the stringent standard of 
appellate review, gives trial judges unfettered ability to dismiss an 
expert, and thus completely dismantle a plaintiff’s cause of action, 
based solely on the judge’s subjective liking of that expert.  
 
 
                                                 
176 See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 141-142. 
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